How Do You Know the Zimmermann Note Was a Reliable Source Explain

1917 Globe War I telegram from Germany to Mexico proposing an alliance

Mexican territory in 1916 (nighttime greenish), territory promised to United mexican states in the Zimmermann telegram (light green), the pre-1836 original Mexican territory (red line)

The Zimmermann Telegram (or Zimmermann Note or Zimmerman Cablevision) was a underground diplomatic advice issued from the German Foreign Office in Jan 1917 that proposed a armed services alliance betwixt Germany and Mexico if the United States entered Globe War I against Deutschland. United mexican states would recover Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. The telegram was intercepted and decoded by British intelligence.

Revelation of the contents enraged Americans, especially later on German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmermann publicly admitted on March 3 that the telegram was genuine. Information technology helped to generate back up for the American announcement of war on Deutschland in Apr.^[i]

The decryption was described equally the most significant intelligence triumph for Great britain during World War I,^[ii] and one of the earliest occasions on which a piece of signal intelligence influenced world events.^[3]

Content

Arthur Zimmermann

The message came in the class of a coded telegram dispatched past Arthur Zimmermann, a Staatssekretär (a superlative-level civil servant) in the Foreign Office of the German language Empire on January 17, 1917. The message was sent to the German ambassador to Mexico, Heinrich von Eckardt.^[4] Zimmermann sent the telegram in anticipation of the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany on Feb 1, which the German authorities presumed would almost certainly atomic number 82 to war with the United States. The telegram instructed Eckardt that if the Us appeared certain to enter the war, he was to approach the Mexican authorities with a proposal for military brotherhood with funding from Frg. The decoded telegram was as follows:

We intend to begin on the first of Feb unrestricted submarine warfare. We shall attempt in spite of this to keep the U.s.a. of America neutral. In the upshot of this non succeeding, nosotros make Mexico a proposal of brotherhood on the post-obit basis: make war together, brand peace together, generous financial support and an agreement on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The settlement in detail is left to you. You will inform the President of the above most secretly as presently as the outbreak of war with the United states is certain, and add the proposition that he should, on his own initiative, invite Japan to immediate adherence and at the same fourth dimension mediate betwixt Nippon and ourselves. Please call the President's attention to the fact that the ruthless employment of our submarines now offers the prospect of compelling England in a few months to brand peace.
Signed, ZIMMERMANN

Background

Previous German efforts to promote war

Germany had long sought to incite a war between Mexico and the United states of america, which would have tied down American forces and slowed the export of American artillery to the Allies.^[5] The Germans had aided in arming Mexico, equally shown by the 1914 Ypiranga Incident.^[6] High german Naval Intelligence officer Franz von Rintelen had attempted to incite a war between United mexican states and the The states in 1915, giving Victoriano Huerta $12 million for that purpose.^[7] The German saboteur Lothar Witzke, responsible for the March 1917 munitions explosion at the Mare Island Naval Shipyard in the San Francisco Bay Area,^[viii] and possibly responsible for the July 1916 Black Tom explosion in New Jersey, was based in Mexico City. The failure of The states troops to capture Pancho Villa in 1916 and the movement of President Carranza in favor of Germany emboldened the Germans to send the Zimmermann note.^[9]

The German provocations were partially successful. President Woodrow Wilson ordered the armed services invasion of Veracruz in 1914 in the context of the Ypiranga Incident and against the communication of the British government.^[10] War was prevented thank you to the Niagara Falls peace briefing organized past the ABC nations, but the occupation was a decisive factor in Mexican neutrality in Globe War I.^[11] United mexican states refused to participate in the embargo against Deutschland and granted full guarantees to the German companies for keeping their operations open, specifically in Mexico City.^[12] These guarantees lasted for 25 years; coincidentally, it was on May 22, 1942, that Mexico alleged war on the Axis Powers later the loss of two Mexican-flagged tankers that calendar month to Kriegsmarine U-boats.

German motivations

The Mexican Telegraph Company edifice in Galveston through which the Zimmerman Telegram was relayed

The Zimmerman Telegram was part of an endeavor carried out by the Germans to postpone the transportation of supplies and other war materials from the United States to the Allies, which were at war against Germany.^[xiii] The main purpose of the telegram was to make the Mexican government declare state of war on the United states of america in hopes of tying downwardly American forces and slowing the export of American arms.^[14] The High german Loftier Control believed that information technology could defeat the British and French on the Western Front and strangle Uk with unrestricted submarine warfare before American forces could be trained and shipped to Europe in sufficient numbers to assistance the Allies. The Germans were encouraged by their successes on the Eastern Front to believe that they could divert large numbers of troops to the Western Front in support of their goals.

Mexican response

Mexican President Venustiano Carranza assigned a military commission to assess the feasibility of the Mexican takeover of their old territories contemplated by Federal republic of germany.^[15] The generals concluded that it would not be possible or fifty-fifty desirable to attempt such an enterprise for the following reasons:

• Mexico was in the midst of a civil war, and Carranza's position was far from secure. A declaration of war by his regime would take provided an opportunity for the opposing factions to align with the United States and Allies in exchange for diplomatic recognition.
• The Usa was far stronger militarily than Mexico was. Even if Mexico'south armed services forces had been completely united and loyal to a unmarried authorities, no serious scenario existed under which it could have invaded and won a war against the The states.
• The German regime'due south promises of "generous financial back up" were very unreliable. It had already informed Carranza in June 1916 that it could not provide the necessary gold needed to stock a completely-contained Mexican national bank.^[sixteen] Even if Mexico received fiscal support, it would still demand to purchase arms, armament, and other needed war supplies from the ABC nations (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile), which would strain relations with them, as explained below.
• Even if by some gamble United mexican states had the military means to win a conflict against the United States and to reclaim the territories in question, information technology would take had astringent difficulty conquering and pacifying a large English-speaking population which had long enjoyed self-government and was better supplied with arms than were most other civilian populations.
• Other strange relations were at stake. The ABC nations had organized the Niagara Falls peace conference in 1914 to avoid a total-calibration war between the United States and Mexico over the United States occupation of Veracruz. Mexico entering a state of war against the U.s. would strain relations with those nations.

The Carranza government was recognized de jure by the United states of america on Baronial 31, 1917, as a direct event of the Zimmermann Telegram to ensure Mexican neutrality during Earth War I.^{[17] [xviii]} Afterwards the military invasion of Veracruz in 1914, Mexico did not participate in any armed forces excursion with the Us in World State of war I.^[11] That ensured that Mexican neutrality was the all-time issue that the United states of america could hope for even if it allowed High german companies to go along their operations in United mexican states open.^[12]

British interception

A portion of the Telegram as decrypted by British Naval Intelligence codebreakers. Since the discussion Arizona was not in the German language codebook, information technology had to exist separate into phonetic syllables.

Zimmermann's office sent the telegram to the German embassy in the United States for retransmission to Eckardt in Mexico. It has traditionally been understood that the telegram was sent over 3 routes. It went by radio, and passed via telegraph cable inside messages sent by diplomats of ii neutral countries (the The states and Sweden).

Directly telegraph transmission of the telegram was impossible because the British had cut the German international cables at the outbreak of state of war. However, Federal republic of germany could communicate wirelessly through the Telefunken plant, operating nether Atlantic Advice Company in Due west Sayville, New York, where the telegram was relayed to the Mexican Consulate. Ironically, the station was under the control of the US Navy, which operated it for Atlantic Communication Company, the American subsidiary of the German entity.

Also, the United States immune express use of its diplomatic cables with Germany to communicate with its administrator in Washington. This privilege was supposed to be used for messages connected with Wilson's peace proposals. The Swedish diplomatic message holding the Zimmerman Telegram went from Stockholm to Buenos Aires over British submarine telegraph cables, and then moved from Buenos Aires to Mexico over the cablevision network of a United states visitor.

All traffic passing through British easily came to British intelligence, peculiarly to the codebreakers and analysts in Room xl at the Admiralty.^[19]

Later on the Germans' telegraph cables had been cut, the German Foreign Office appealed to the U.s.a. for utilise of their diplomatic telegraphic messages for peace messages. President Wilson agreed in the belief both that such co-functioning would sustain continued good relations with Germany and that more than efficient German-American diplomacy could assist Wilson's goal of a negotiated end to the war. The Germans handed in messages to the American diplomatic mission in Berlin, which were relayed to the diplomatic mission in Denmark and and then to the United States by American telegraph operators. The United States placed weather on German usage, most notably that all messages had to be in cleartext (uncoded). Even so, Wilson later reversed the order and relaxed the wireless rules to allow coded messages to be sent.^[twenty] The Germans assumed that this road was secure and and so used information technology extensively.^[19]

However, that put German diplomats in a precarious situation since they relied on the United States to transmit Zimmermann's note to its terminal destination, but the bulletin's unencrypted contents would exist deeply alarming to the Americans. The Germans persuaded Usa Administrator James W. Gerard to accept it in coded course, and it was transmitted on January 16, 1917.^[19]

In Room twoscore, Nigel de Grayness had partially decoded the telegram past the next 24-hour interval.^[21] By 1917, the diplomatic lawmaking 13040 had been in use for many years. Since there had been ample time for Room 40 to reconstruct the code cryptanalytically, it was readable to a fair degree. Room xl had obtained German cryptographic documents, including the diplomatic lawmaking 3512 (captured during the Mesopotamian campaign), which was a after updated code that was similar to just not really related to code 13040, and naval code SKM (Signalbuch der Kaiserlichen Marine), ⁠which was useless for decoding the Zimmermann Telegram but valuable to decode naval traffic, which had been retrieved from the wrecked cruiser SMSMagdeburg past the Russians, who passed information technology to the British.^[22]

Disclosure of the telegram would sway American public opinion confronting Deutschland if the British could convince the Americans that the text was genuine, but the Room 40 primary William Reginald Hall was reluctant to permit information technology out because the disclosure would expose the German language codes broken in Room twoscore and British eavesdropping on U.s. diplomatic traffic. Hall waited iii weeks during which de Greyness and cryptographer William Montgomery completed the decryption. On February 1, Frg appear resumption of "unrestricted" submarine warfare, an human activity that led the United States to break off diplomatic relations with Federal republic of germany on February iii.^[19]

The Telegram, completely decrypted and translated

Hall passed the telegram to the British Foreign Part on February v simply still warned against releasing it. Meanwhile, the British discussed possible cover stories to explicate to the Americans how they obtained the coded text of the telegram without admitting to their ability to read intercepted American diplomatic communications, which they would continue to do for another 25 years, and to explain how they obtained the cleartext of the telegram without letting anyone know that the codes had been broken. Furthermore, the British needed to find a way to convince the Americans the bulletin was non a forgery.^[two]

For the showtime story, the British obtained the coded text of the telegram from the Mexican commercial telegraph office. The British knew that since the German embassy in Washington would relay the message by commercial telegraph, the Mexican telegraph office would have the coded text. "Mr. H", a British agent in Mexico, bribed an employee of the commercial telegraph visitor for a re-create of the message. Sir Thomas Hohler, the British ambassador in United mexican states, later claimed to have been "Mr. H" or at least to have been involved with the interception in his autobiography.^{[23] [ citation needed ]} The coded text could then be shown to the Americans without embarrassment.

Moreover, the retransmission was encoded with the older code 13040 and so past mid-February, the British had the complete text and the ability to release the telegram without revealing the extent to which the latest German language codes had been broken. (At worst, the Germans might take realized that the 13040 code had been compromised, but that was a run a risk worth taking against the possibility of United states of america entry into the state of war.) Finally, since copies of the 13040 codetext would also have been deposited in the records of the American commercial telegraph company, the British had the ability to testify the authenticity of the message to the American authorities.^[iii]

As a comprehend story, the British could publicly claim that their agents had stolen the telegram's decoded text in Mexico. Privately, the British needed to give the Americans the 13040 code so that the American authorities could verify the authenticity of the bulletin independently with their ain commercial telegraphic records, just the Americans agreed to dorsum the official embrace story. The German Foreign Function refused to consider that their codes could take been broken simply sent Eckardt on a witch hunt for a traitor in the embassy in Mexico. Eckardt indignantly rejected those accusations, and the Foreign Function eventually declared the embassy exonerated.^[19]

Use

On February 19, Hall showed the telegram to Edward Bell, the secretarial assistant of the American Embassy in Uk. Bell was at offset incredulous and thought that information technology was a forgery. Once Bell was convinced the bulletin was 18-carat, he became enraged. On February xx, Hall informally sent a copy to United states Ambassador Walter Hines Page. On February 23, Page met with British Strange Minister Arthur Balfour and was given the codetext, the message in German, and the English translation. The British had obtained a further re-create in United mexican states City, and Balfour could obscure the real source with the one-half-truth that it had been "bought in Mexico".^[24] Page then reported the story to Wilson on Feb 24, 1917, including details to be verified from telegraph-visitor files in the United States. Wilson felt "much indignation" toward the Germans and wanted to publish the Zimmermann Telegraph immediately afterward he had received information technology from the British, merely he delayed until March ane, 1917.^[25]

U.S. response

1917 political cartoon near the Zimmermann Telegram

Many Americans then held anti-Mexican as well as anti-German views. Mexicans had a considerable amount of anti-American sentiment in return, some of which was caused by the American occupation of Veracruz.^[26] Full general John J. Pershing had long been chasing the revolutionary Pancho Villa for raiding into American territory and carried out several cantankerous-border expeditions. News of the telegram further inflamed tensions between the United States and United mexican states.

"Exploding in his Easily"

However, many Americans, particularly those with German or Irish ancestry, wished to avoid the conflict in Europe. Since the public had been told falsely that the telegram had been stolen in a decoded form in Mexico, the message was at commencement widely believed to be an elaborate forgery created by British intelligence. That belief, which was not restricted to pacifist and pro-German lobbies, was promoted past High german and Mexican diplomats alongside some antiwar American newspapers, especially those by the Hearst printing empire.

The Wilson administration was thus presented with a dilemma. With the evidence the United States had been provided confidentially by the British, Wilson realized the bulletin was genuine, just he could non make the evidence public without compromising the British codebreaking operation.

Any doubts as to the authenticity of the telegram were removed by Zimmermann himself. At a press briefing on March three, 1917, he told an American journalist, "I cannot deny it. Information technology is true." Then, on March 29, 1917, Zimmermann gave a voice communication in the Reichstag in which he admitted that the telegram was 18-carat.^[27] Zimmermann hoped that Americans would sympathize that the thought was that Deutschland would not fund Mexico's war with the Us unless the Americans joined World State of war I.

On February 1, 1917, Federal republic of germany began unrestricted submarine warfare confronting all ships in the Atlantic bearing the American flag, both passenger and merchant ships. Ii ships were sunk in Feb, and most American shipping companies held their ships in port. Likewise the highly-provocative state of war proposal to Mexico, the telegram also mentioned "ruthless employment of our submarines". Public stance demanded activeness. Wilson had refused to assign U.s. Navy crews and guns to the merchant ships, but once the Zimmermann note was public, Wilson called for arming the merchant ships although antiwar members of the US Senate blocked his proposal.^[28]

On April 6, 1917, Congress voted to declare war on Germany. Wilson had asked Congress for "a war to end all wars" that would "make the world prophylactic for democracy".^[29]

Wilson considered another military invasion of Veracruz and Tampico in 1917–1918,^{[thirty] [31]} to pacify the Isthmus of Tehuantepec and Tampico oil fields and to ensure their continued production during the ceremonious state of war,^{[31] [32]} just this time, Mexican President Venustiano Carranza, recently installed, threatened to destroy the oil fields if the US Marines landed there.^{[33] [34]}

Japanese response

The Japanese authorities, some other nation mentioned in the Zimmerman Telegram, was already involved in World War I, on the side of the Allies against Germany. The authorities later released a statement that Nippon was not interested in irresolute sides and in attacking America.^[35]

Autograph discovery

In October 2005, information technology was reported that an original typescript of the decoded Zimmermann Telegram had recently been discovered by an unnamed historian who was researching and preparing an official history of the Great britain's Authorities Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The certificate is believed to exist the actual telegram shown to the American ambassador in London in 1917. Marked in Admiral Hall's handwriting at the top of the document are the words: "This is the one handed to Dr Page and exposed by the President." Since many of the cloak-and-dagger documents in this incident had been destroyed, information technology had previously been assumed that the original typed "decrypt" was gone forever. Withal, after the discovery of this document, the GCHQ official historian said: "I believe that this is indeed the same document that Balfour handed to Page."^[36]

Meet also

• American entry into World War I
• Imperial German plans for the invasion of the United States
• United mexican states in Earth War I
• Zinoviev letter

References

1. ^ *Andrew, Christopher (1996). For The President's Eyes Only. Harper Collins. p. 42. ISBN0-00-638071-nine.
2. ^ ^{a b} "Why was the Zimmerman Telegram and then important?". BBC. January 17, 2017. Retrieved January 17, 2017.
3. ^ ^{a b} "The telegram that brought America into the First Earth War". BBC History Magazine. January 17, 2017. Retrieved January 17, 2017.
4. ^ "Washington Exposes Plot" (PDF). The Associated Press. Washington. February 28, 1917. Retrieved January 11, 2020.
5. ^ Katz, Friedrich (1981). The Secret State of war in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution. pp. 328–329.
6. ^ Katz (1981), pp. 232–240.
7. ^ Katz (1981), pp. 329–332.
8. ^ Tucker, Spencer & Roberts, Priscilla Mary (2005). World War One. Santa Barbara CA: ABC-CLIO. p. 1606. ISBNone-85109-420-2.
9. ^ Katz (1981), pp. 346–347.
10. ^ Small-scale, Michael (2009). The Forgotten Peace: Mediation at Niagara Falls, 1914. Ottawa, Canada: University of Ottawa. p. 35. ISBN9780776607122.
11. ^ ^{a b} Stacy, Lee (2002). Mexico and the United States, Volume 3. U.s.a.: Marshall Cavendish. p. 869. ISBN9780761474050.
12. ^ ^{a b} Buchenau, Jürgen (2004). Tools of Progress: A High german Merchant Family in Mexico City, 1865–Present. Us: Academy of New Mexico Printing. p. 82. ISBN9780826330888.
13. ^ Tuchman, Barbara W. (1958). The Zimmerman Telegram . pp. 63, 73–74. ISBN0-345-32425-0.
14. ^ Katz (1981), pp. 328–329.
15. ^ Katz (1981), p. 364.
16. ^ Beezley, William; Meyer, Michael (2010). The Oxford History of Mexico. Britain: Oxford University Printing. p. 476. ISBN9780199779932.
17. ^ Paterson, Thomas; Clifford, J. Garry; Brigham, Robert; Donoghue, Michael; Hagan, Kenneth (2010). American Strange Relations, Volume 1: To 1920. USA: Cengage Learning. p. 265. ISBN9781305172104.
18. ^ Paterson, Thomas; Clifford, John Garry; Hagan, Kenneth J. (1999). American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895. The states: Houghton Mifflin College Division. p. 51. ISBN9780395938874.
19. ^ ^{a b c d e} West, Nigel (1990). The Sigint Secrets: The Signals Intelligence War, 1990 to Today-Including the Persecution of Gordon Welchman. New York: Quill. pp. 83, 87–92. ISBN0-688-09515-ane.
20. ^ NY Times, September iv, 1914
21. ^ Gannon, Paul (2011). Inside Room xl: The Codebreakers of Globe War I. London: Ian Allan Publishing. ISBN978-0-7110-3408-2.
22. ^ Polmar, Norman & Noot, Jurrien (1991). Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies 1718–1990. Annapolis: The states Naval Institute Press.
23. ^ "Intelligence Insight No. 004 podcast at 44:14 minutes". bletchleypark.org.uk. The Bletchley Park Trust. Retrieved Jan 5, 2021.
24. ^ Stevenson, D. (David), 1954- (2017). 1917 : war, peace, and revolution (First ed.). Oxford. p. 59. ISBN978-0-19-870238-2. OCLC 982092927. {{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
25. ^ Stevenson, D. (David), 1954- (2017). 1917 : war, peace, and revolution (First ed.). Oxford. p. 59. ISBN978-0-19-870238-2. OCLC 982092927. {{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors listing (link)
26. ^ Link, Arthur S. (1965). Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace: 1916–1917.
27. ^ Meyer, Michael C. (1966). "The Mexican-German Conspiracy of 1915". The Americas. 23 (i): 76–89. doi:x.2307/980141. JSTOR 980141.
28. ^ Leopold, Richard Westward (1962). The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History. Random House. pp. 330–31.
29. ^ Link, Arthur S. (1972). Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910–1917. New York: Harper & Row. pp. 252–282.
30. ^ Gruening, Ernest (1968). Mexico and Its Heritage. U.Southward.: Greenwood Press. p. 596. ISBN9780837104577.
31. ^ ^{a b} Halevy, Drew Philip (2000). Threats of Intervention: U. South.-Mexican Relations, 1917–1923. U.S.: iUniverse. p. 41. ISBN9781469701783.
32. ^ Meyer, Lorenzo (1977). United mexican states and the United States in the Oil Controversy, 1917–1942. U.Due south.: University of Texas Press. p. 45. ISBN9780292750326.
33. ^ Haber, Stephen; Maurer, Noel; Razo, Armando (2003). The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in United mexican states, 1876–1929. United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland: Cambridge Academy Press. p. 201. ISBN9780521820677.
34. ^ Meyer, Lorenzo (1977), p. 44
35. ^ Lee, Roger. "Zimmerman Telegram: What Was The Zimmerman Telegram, and How Did It Affect World War One?". The History Guy . Retrieved July 27, 2018.
36. ^ Fenton, Ben (October 17, 2005). "Telegram that brought United states of america into Great State of war is Establish Found". The Telegraph. London.

Sources

• Beesly, Patrick (1982). Room 40: British Naval Intelligence, 1914–1918. New York: Harcourt, Caryatid, Jovanovich. ISBN0-fifteen-178634-eight.
• Boghardt, Thomas (Nov 2003). The Zimmermann Telegram: Diplomacy, Intelligence and The American Entry into World State of war I (PDF). Working Newspaper Series. Washington DC: The BMW Center for German and European Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. six-04. Archived from the original (PDF) on September two, 2006. ; 35pp
• Boghardt, Thomas (2012). The Zimmermann Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America's Entry into Globe War I. p. 319. ISBN978-1612511481.
• Capozzola, Christopher (2008). Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Denizen. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online. ISBN9780195335491.
• Hopkirk, Peter (1994). On Secret Service East of Constantinople. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN0-nineteen-280230-five.
• Massie, Robert K. (2007). Castles of Steel. London: Vintage Books. ISBN978-0-09-952378-ix.
• Pommerin, Reiner (1996). "Reichstagsrede Zimmermanns (Auszug), 30. März 1917". 'Quellen zu den deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Vol. 1. pp. 213–16.
• Singh, Simon (September viii, 1999). "The Zimmermann Telegraph". The Independent. Independent Print Limited. Archived from the original on August fourteen, 2014. Retrieved Baronial xiv, 2014. Alt URL

Further reading

• Bernstorff, Count Johann Heinrich (1920). My Three Years in America. New York: Scribner. pp. 310–11.
• Bridges, Lamar West. (1969). "Zimmermann telegram: reaction of Southern, Southwestern newspapers". Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly. 46 (ane): 81–86. doi:x.1177/107769906904600112. S2CID 144936173.
• Dugdale, Blanche (1937). Arthur James Balfour. New York: Putnam. Vol. II, pp. 127–129.
• Hendrick, Burton J. (2003) [1925]. The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page. Kessinger Publishing. ISBN0-7661-7106-X.
• Kahn, David (1996) [1967]. The Codebreakers. New York: Macmillan.
• Tuchman, Barbara W. The Zimmermann Telegram (1958) online best-seller for the lay reader by the noted historian
• Winkler, Jonathan Reed (2008). Nexus: Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Printing. ISBN978-0-674-02839-5.

External links

This page was terminal edited on 2 March 2022, at 20:14

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Source: https://wiki2.org/en/Zimmermann_Telegram

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